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Shortcomings of current policy
Community competition policy concerning vertical restraints has a history of nearly forty
years. Although this policy has been successful a review is necessary. The reasons for this
review were amply described in the Green Paper on Vertical Restraints '. The Green Paper has
identified a number of shortcomings in current policy, which can be summarised as follows.
First, the current Block-Exemption Regulations (BEs) comprise rather strict form-based
requirements and as a result are considered too legalistic and work as a strait-jacket. This is
especially awkward in the light of the major changes in methods of distribution that have
taken place and still are taking place. For the vertical agreements that, sometimes with
difficulty, do fall within the current BEs a compliance burden is created through unnecessary
legal uncertainty. Companies without sigflificant market power suffer unnecessary regulation
and may even be prevented from using vertical restraints to improve their competitive
position in the market.
Secondly, for those agreements that fall within the BEs there is the real risk that the
Commission is exempting agreements that distort competition. As the BEs are form-based
instead of effect-based and do not contain any market share limit, companies with significant
market power can benefit from them. The sanction of withdrawal is in this respect not seen as
a real deterrent because it works only with effect for the future. Thus, the present BEs exempt
for instance, non-compete obligations up to 100% market share although these may cause
serious foreclosure effects and allow the charging of exorbitant prices on the market to the
detriment of-consumers.
Thirdly, as the BEs only cover vertical agreements concerning the resale of final goods and
not intermediate goods or services
2 a significant part of all vertical agreements are not
covered by the current BEs, even when the parties involved have no market power. This
means that an urmecessarily large number of vertical restraints could in principle be
scrutinised, resulting in legal uncertainty and unnecessary enforcement costs.
Need for a more economics based approach
To remedy these three shortcomings and better protect competition, the primary objective of
Community competition policy, a more economics based approach is required. Such an
approach should be based on the effects on the market; vertical agreements should be
analysed in their market context. It is only when inter-brand competition is weak and market
power exists that it becomes important to control vertical agreements. This should facilitate a
relaxation of the form-based requirements, ensure that fewer agreements are covered by
Article 85(1) and afford a better scrutiny of agreements of companies having substantial
market power. This can be depicted as follows.
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in Community Competition Policy, COM(96) 721 final, adopted by
the Commission on 22. 1.1997.
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All types of Vertical Restraints
Most markets are fairly competitive, the companies not having market power. Therefore, the number of cases that may need scrutiny, as depicted below will be relatively low. This is





Block -Exem  ptedlDe-Minimis
All types of Vertical Restraints
In reforming Community competition policy in the field of vertical restraints, the Commission pursues the following objectives:
the protection of competition, which is the primary objective of Community
competition policy, as it enhances consumer welfare and creates an efficient allocation
of resources;
market integration, in the light of enlargement, which remains a second important
objective when assessing competition issues.
In addition, the effects on the overall level of legal certainty for business, the enforcement
costs to business and competition authorities, and the possibilities for improving
decentralisation have to be taken into account.
In more than 80% of the merger cases dealt with under the Merger Regulation in 1997, the market shares of the individual parties were below 25%. As these merger cases only concern large companies
and often the most narrow market definition is looked at in the first phase of investigation in order to
clear the merger, it can be expected that in the economy as a whole, market shares will be even lower.The policy proposal set out in this Communication is based on a more economic approach.
This is required, as was explained above, to remedy the shortcomings of current policy. For
situations without significant market power a safe harbour needs to be created, thus providing
a presumption of legality for those vertical restraints that are likely to have no net negative
effects. Vertical restraints falling outside the .safe harbour will not be presumed to be illegal
but may need individual examination. In the context of individual examination, the
Commission will have the burden of proof that the agreement in question infringes
Article 85(1) and will have to examine whether the agreement does or does not fulfil the
conditions of Article 85(3).
The proposed safe harbour consists of one broad umbrella Block-Exemption regulation
covering all vertical restraints for the distribution of goods and services . This regulation
uses market-share thresholds to distinguish between agreements that are ' or are not
block-exempted. By being based primarily on a black-clause approach, i.e. defining what is
not block exempted instead of defining what is exempted, it avoids the strait-jacket effect and
facilitates the simplification of the applicable rules. The policy will ensure that the vast
majority 'Of vertical agreements where no significant net negative effect can be expected no
longer require individ1.lal scrutiny. It will thereby allow the Commission and national
competition authorities to concentrate on the important cases. It treats different forms of
vertical agreements having similar effects in a similar way, preventing unjustified
differentiation in policy between forms or sectors and avoiding a policy bias in the choice
companies "make concerning their formats of distribution. In order to maintain a sufficient
level of legal certainty the Block-Exemption "regulation will be supplemented by guidelines
detailing the Commission s policy concerning individual examination above the market share
thresholds and possible withdrawal of the Block-Exemption below the thresholds.
Structure of the present communication
This Communication has the following structure:
Section II summarises the comments the Commission received on the Green Paper;
Section III provides an economic assessment of vertical restraints and their effects;
Section IV discusses the issues of market-share thresholds and legal certainty;
Section V describes the proposed new policy;
Section VI describes the procedural steps which will be followed to adopt the
proposed policy.
Motor vehicle distribution is the only sector not covered by this exercise, see Green Paper on
Vertical Restraints in Community Competition Policy, p. 2, footnote No 2. SECTION II: SUMMARY OF REACTIONS TO THE GREEN PAPER
Written submissions on the Green Paper
The consultation exercise launched by the Green Paper produced 227 written submissions. A
large majority (64%) of the submissions came from either companies or associations
representing companies. Only 6 submissions were received from consumer organisations. Of
the companies and associations of companies who made submissions, ~. large percentage
(31%) came from either th~ beer or petrol sector. The primary concern of most submissions
was legal certainty (37% of all submissions). Only 41 submissions (18%), mainly from
academics and national authorities, placed their primary emphasis on the protection
of competition.
Most submissions believe the current system to be too legalistic and favour a more economic
approach. It is felt that an economic, effects-based approach rather than a clause-based
approach would be more suitable for dealing with a dynamic sector such as distribution. The
current system tends to produce negative effects on the evolution of distribution, preventing
undertakings from introducing new and innovative distribution formats which could lead to
substantial gains in terms of efficiency. Of those who commented on this issue 95% favour a
more economic approach, while 97% believe that the current system has too much of a
strait-jacket effect. Of those who commented on the competition effects of vertical restraints,
42% view vertical restraints as having primarily a positive effect on competition, while 50%
are of the view that vertical restraints may have both positive and negative effects on
competition. As possible negative effects, foreclosure and dampening of competition were
mentioned, with the former being seen as the main problem. .
While there is general consensus on the need for a more economic based approach
, there is no
agreement on how to implement such an approach. Nearly half (41 %) of those that
commented on market-share tests believe market shares to be a good indicator of market
power. Most commentators however pointed out the difficulties of defining markets and
assessing market shares. These difficulties were said to give rise 
to a high degree of legal
uncertainty and the majority of those who commented did not favour a market-share 
cap. In
the course of the consultation exercise, the support for the use of a market-share test
increased, but companies asked the Commission to adopt sufficient flanking measures so as
to make the market-share test operable.
In the Green Paper, five options were described, namely:
1. Option I: maintain the current system;
2. Option II: wider block exemptions without a market-share cap;
3. Option III: more focused block exemptions with a market-share cap of (40%);
4. Option IV -I: negative clearance presumption up to (20%) and above wider
block-exemptions without a market-share cap; and5. Option IV-II: negative clearance presumption up to (20%) and above wider
block-exemptions with a market-share cap of (40%).
It was stated clearly in the Green Paper that the list of options proposed was not exhaustive. It
is therefore not surprising that three other options have been proposed by several interested
parties, namely: 
6. An umbrella block-exemption: one wide block-exemption based on a blacklist approach
and without market shares;
7. Guidelines: no block-exemption but only guidelines indicating how the Commission
would apply Article 85 in individual cases;
8. A control-of-abuse system: all vertical restraints would be presumed  a priori  lawful, with
the Commission having the power to suspend the positive presumption only with effect for
the future.
Set out below is a statistical breakdown or support for the various options referred to above:
Options In favour Not in Favour No comment
Option I (maintain current system):  16. 51.6% 31.8%
Option II (wider block-exemptions without a 46. 23. 30.5%
market-share cap):
Option III (more focused block-exemptions 59. 33.
with a market-sharecao of r40%):
Option IV-I (negative clearance presumption 20. 59. 20.
up to (20%) and above wider
block-exemptions without a market-share
cap):
Option IV -II (negative clearance 82.4%
presumption up to (20%) and above wider
block-exemptions with market-share cap of
(40%1):
Umbrella Block-exemption without 17% 78.1 %
market shares
7. Guidelines only 10. 87.4%
Control-of-abuse system 10. 6.3% 82.
A number of other individual options were proposed, such as a foreclosure test based on market shares.Public hearing
On 6 and 7 October 1997, the Commission organised .a public hearing for industry and .other
interested parties on the Green Paper. Companies, associations, law firms, consumer
arganisations etc. who had made a written submission were invited to come to the hearing.
Most Member States also sent observers, as did the EFTA Surveillance Authority, Norway,
Iceland, and a considerable number of the Central and Eastern European countries.
There was a large element of consensus that market power and a reduction in inter-brand
competition are the circumstances under which vertical restraints may haw negative effects.
There was similar consensus that the Commission should adopt a more economic approach to
get away from the current legalistic strait-jacket. Most also considered that there is a link
between market power and market share but stressed that they are not synonymous.
In the light of the increased lega: uncertainty that a market share test would bring to thase
who currently benefit from existing BE Regulations, a large majority were against
introduction of such a test ta limit the applicability of block-exemptions. A limited number of
cammentators stressed that a market-share test would be feasible and is the best possible
indicator of market power available. No alternatives were provided.
On the question of which vertical rest~aints should remain  per se  prohibited there was
cansensus that resale price maintenance and absalute territorial protection shauld not be
cavered by any black-exemption and should in most cases alsa nat qualify for individual
exemption. However, it was argued that individual exemptian should not be completely
excluded. At the hearing support was expressed ta allaw true maximum "resale price
maintenance. it being recognised that it is difficult ta identify what a true maximum price is.
On the argument that vertical restraints can help to solve free rider problems , i.e. to ensure
that the one who makes an effart is able to appropriate all the benefits the effort engenders
opinions were divided. At the hearing some argued that free rider problems occur quite often
especially through the actians .of retailers outside the official dealer network. This was argued
by representatives from amangst .others the car, perfumes, petrol, consumer electronics and
tay industries. They favoured action to stop 'leakage' from the system, including the power to
ban parallel imports. However, it was not explained whether real free-rider problems were at
the heart of the problem - that is that the outside retailers truly profit from the investments
made by the netwark - or whether the issue was really one of trying to shut out certain
retailers in order to reduce competition and increase prices. The latter argument was
mentioned by several participants, including distributors and large retailers. These
cammentators stressed the vital impartance of parallel imports ta enable them ta make use of
price differences between Member States.
It was recognised that in order to achieve a more econamic approach, a compromise has to be
faund between such an approach and legal certainty. A number of participants were of the
.opinion that most vertical agreements are innocuous from a competition point of view or are
even pro-competitive. They therefore favoured either option II (wider block-exemptions),
Option IV -1 (the same in addition to a negative clearance presumption) or one very wide
black-exemption, preferably with only black clauses. A few were in favour of a future policy
using market share threshalds as in Option IV-II (block-exemptions with a market-share cap)
.or a foreclosure test based on market shares.It was stressed that, in the event market-share tests were' introduced, the Commission should
provide as many flanking measures as possible to protect legal certainty. In particular, it was
mentioned that the Commission should (1) provide guidelines on the application of the rules
above the market-share thresholds, (2) solve the problem of automatic nullity under
Article 85(2) where a company has failed to notify because it incorrectly assessed its
market share, (3) possibly introduce a non-opposition procedure, and (4) reduce the burden
of notification.
Opinions of the Community Institutions and of the Member States
The European Parliament
In its Resolution of J 8 July 1997 the European Parliament notes that, apart from the
de minimis  notice, business is opposed to the use .of a market-share .approach and that this
approach is not always the most efficient indicator of market power. It therefore calls on the
Commission to examine the possibility of using other parameters. It stresses the need to
secure legal certainty for SMEs so that voluntary retail chains are put on the same footing as
large integrated groups, particularly in terms of a common pricing strategy. It also calls on the
Commission to examine whether it is necessary to draw up a block-exemption regulation for
selective distribution and asks for attention to be paid to the special commercial or financial
advantages in ,beer supply and service-station agreements.
The Parliament expresses a preference for a system in which the vertical agreements of
companies having less than 10% market share fall outside Article 85(1). Above this
threshold, block~exemptions should leave more room for flexibility without disturbing the
balance between the contracting parties. Above a certain market share threshold the benefit of
a block-exemption should be easy to withdraw. Only if such an easy withdrawal procedure is
not possible should the Commission consider creating block-exemptions that do not
apply above a certain market-share threshold, and then only for companies with a
significant turnover.
The Economic and Social Committee
In its Opinion of 4 June 1997 the Economic and Social Committee recognises that the current
block-exemption regulations are too rigid and often difficult to interpret. Emphasis should be
placed on the importance of market structure in assessing the effects of vertical restraints
together with the need to focus on the market impact, rather than the formal content of
agreements. ,The Committee is in favour of expanding the block-exemptions to apply to
upstream linkages in the supply chain between producers and suppliers of necessary inputs.
The wider the coverage of the block-exemptions, the less the need for individual notifications
of vertical agreements. It would also welcome the addition of a non-opposition procedure.
While not opposed to Option II (wider block-exemptions without a market-share cap) the
Committee strongly recommends Option IV, Variant I (Option II with a negative clearance
presumption up to (20%)). It has reservations about Option IV, Variant II (Option IV -I with a
market-share cap of (40%)). However, if the Commission were able to introduce Option IV
Variant I, combined with extremely wide block-exemptions, then the .Committee could see acase for a procedural mechanism for monitoring vertical distribution agreements with high
market shares.
Committee of the Regions
In its Opinion of 12 June 1997 the Committee of the Regions considers that the multi-faceted
nature of the question of vertical restraints makes it difficult to select a single option which is
not highly debatable for one sector or another. Whichever option is selected, agreements -
such as those for beer - must be safeguarded. Views other than those of manufacturers and
distributors should be brought into the process of assessing consumer benefit. In relation to
Options III and IV, the introduction of market share thresholds only makes sense if these are
expressed in terms of the entire Community market. The Committee believes that ultimately
the option which should be selected is Option 
Member States
All but one of the fifteen Member States made written submissions on the Green Paper. Many
of these submissions were made on a preliminary basis. There was no clear consensus on the
format of future policy in this area. With regard to the options set out in the Green Paper
none of the Member States expressed a preference for Option I or III, four gave a preference
for Option II, three gave.a preference for Option IV, Variant I, and tWo gave a preference for
Option IV, Variant II. The remaining five Member States put forward other substantive
options of their own. These may be summarised as follows:
a negative-clearance regulation providing that almost all vertical restraints would be
deemed  a priori  lawful, irrespective of market share, with the Commission, national
authorities and national judges having the power to declare the regulation inapplicable
with retroactive effect if there is no effective competition or if there are high barriers
to entry in the market;
a single block-exemption for all vertical agreements, with a market-share threshold of
(25%). Above this market share, agreements would be covered by the individual
exemption system. Below this threshold, the Commission would have the power of
withdrawal for problematic cases;
a negative clearance regulation with two market share thresholds. The first (25-40%)
to indicate the market share level above which a company is likely to exercise
substantial market power. The second (60-80%) to indicate the possible restrictions
caused by companies with at least a 10-15% market share in case of a cumulative
effect of parallel network agreements;
a single black-clause block-exemption. The exemption would apply irrespective of
market share. The Commission would be able to ask for individual notifications. The
block-exemption would confer provisional validity upon vertical agreements, which
could be withdrawn only with effect for the future;
broader and more flexible block-exemptions, the application of which would be
controlled a posteriori  by the national competition authorities.The first element of general consensus amongst the Member States relates to the need to
change the Commission s current policy on vertical restraints. It is recognised that the
adoption of a more economic based approach would of necessity result in a system with less
legal certainty for companies with market power who currently benefit from existing
BE Regulations. The second element of consensus relates to the most recent economic
literature, according, to which vertical restraints should only be considered as capable of
harming competition when they are linked to some degree of market power. The
third element of consensus relates to the need for maintaining the importance given to the
market integration objective in the assessment of vertical restraints, particularly in the light of
future enlargement. 
As a follow up to this consensus there appear to be two trends of thought. The fIrst tends to
simply promote the introduction of a level of flexibility within the existing system by
reducing the regulatory approach of the current block-exemption regulations. A second
approach is based on the need to adopt a real change in policy. This second approach has
two major hypotheses. The first is based on maintaining the current prohibition system of
Article 85. This system could be adjusted, by the introduction of market-share thresholds. The
aim of these thresholds would be to determine, on the basis of the market-power level, both
the absence of grounds for the application of Article 85(1) arid the field of application of a
single, wide block-exemption covering all vertical restraints. The second hypothesis is based
on a switch from a prohibition to a control of abuse system. This system would in effect grant
almost all vertical restraints an  a priori  presumption of compatibility with Article 85(1), with
the possibility for the Commission to withdraw this positive presumption with effect only for
the future.
In the course of the consultation exercise, the positions expressed by the Member States
on the Green. Paper have evolved and led to a greater consensus on the policy proposal set
out in this communication, i.e. one broad Block-Exemption regulation limited by one/two
market-share threshold(s).SECTION III: ECONOMICS OF VERTICALS
Vertical restraints and market power
As indicated in the introduction, economics tells us that in the field of vertical restraints
competitionconcems can only arise if there is insufficient inter-brand competition, i.e. if
there exists a certain degree of market power; On the one hand, the fiercer the inter-brand
competition is, the more likely it is that vertical restraints have no negative effect or at least a
net positive effect. On the other hand, the weaker the inter-brand competition, the more likely
it is that vertical restraints have a net negative effect. This means that the same vertical
restraint can have different effects depending on the market structure and on the market
power of the company ,applying the vertical restraint.
In economics, market power is usually defined as the power to raise price above the
competitive level (in the short run marginal cost, in the long run average total cost). In other
words
, .
a company has market power if it has a perceptible influence on the price against
which it can sell and if by charging a price above the competitive level it is able, at least in '
the short term, to obtain supra-normal profits. Most economists would agree that there exists
market power below the level of dominaI1ge as defined by the Court of Justice. This view was
also expressed in the Green Paper , to indicate that vertical restraints can harm competition
below the level of dominance and therefore that Article 86 and merger control will not
suffice. Article 85 needs to be applied to vertical restraints, in particular in oligopolistic
markets where none of the individual companies hold a dominant position.
It is also generally recognised that vertical restraints are on average less harmful than
horizontal competition restraints. The main reason for treating a vertical res~raint more
leniently than a horizontal restraint lies in the fact that the latter may concern an agreement
between competitors producing substitute goods/services while the former concerns an
agreement between a supplier and a buyer of a particular product/service. In horizontal
situations the exercise of market power by one company (higher price of its product) will
benefit its competitors. This may provide an incentive to competitors to induce each other to
behave anti-competitively. In vertical situations the product of the one is the input for the
other. This means that the exercise of market power by either the upstream or downstream
company would normally hurt the demand for the product of the other. The companies
involved in the agreement may therefore have an incentive to prevent the exercise of market
power by the other (so called self-policing character of vertical restraints).
However, this self-restraining character should not be over-estimated. When a company has
no market power it can only try to increase its profits byoptimising its manufacturing and
distribution processes, with or without the help of vertical restraints. However, when it does
have market power it can also try to increase its profits at the expense of its direct competitors
by raising their costs and at the expense of its buyers/consumers by trying to appropriate some
of their surplus. This can happen when the upstream and downstream company share the
extra profits or when one of the two imposes the vertical restraint and thereby appropriates all
the extra profits.
Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in Community Competition Policy, point 303,The negative effects
Individual vertiGal restraints
The negative effects on the market that may result from anti-competitive wrtical agreements
and that Community competition law aims at preventing are the following:
foreclosure, either of other suppliers or of other buyers;
the deterioration of price and non-price conditions available to 'consumers. either for
one particular brand (reduction of intra-brand competition) or between different
brands (reduction of inter-brand competition);
collusion amongst suppliers or buyers facilitated by vertical restraints:
the creation of obstacles to market integration, including, most of alL limitations on
the freedom of the European consumers to purchase a good or service in any
Member State they may choose.
Such negative effects may result from various vertical restraints. Special care is needed due to
the fact that agreements which are different in form may have the same substantive impact on
competition. To analyse these possible negative effects it is appropriate to divide vertical
restraints into four groups: an exclusive-distribution group, a single-branding group. a
resale-price maintenance group and a market-partitioning group. The vertical restraints within
each group seem to have similar negative effects on competition.
Before describing the four groups a number of general points need to be made. First, the
analysis applies to both goods and services, although certain restraints are mainly used in the
distribution of goods. This is why throughout this text the term good(s) means both good(s)
and service(s) unless otherwise stated. Secondly, vertical agreements can be concluded for
intermediate and final goods and services. Unless otherwise stated the analysis and arguments
in the text apply to all levels of trade and the neutral terms supplier and buyer are used. When
only a specific level is implicated this is indicated. Thirdly, the classification is based upon
what could be described as the basic components of vertical restraints. In practice many
vertical agreements make use of more than one of these components. To give an example.
exclusive distribution usually limits the number of buyers the supplier can sell to and often at
the same time limits the area where the buyers can be active. The first component may lead to
foreclosure of other buyers while the second component may lead to market partitioning.
ExclZlSive-distribution group
Under the heading of  exclusive distribution COme those agreements/components that have as
their main element that the manufacturer is selling only to one or a limited number of buyers.
This may be to restrict the number of buyers for a particular territory or group of customers,
or to restrict the kind of buyers. This group comprises amongst others exclusive distribution
and exclusive customer allocation as the supplier limits its sales to only one buyer for a
certain territory or class of customers. It also comprises exclusive supply and quantity forcing
on the supplier, where an obligation or incentive scheme agreed between the supplier and the
buyer makes the former to sell on a particular market only or mainly to one buyer. This groupalso comprises selective distribution, where the conditions imposed on or agreed with the
selected dealers may limit their number.
There are two main effects on competition: (1) certain buyers within that market can no
longer buy from this particular supplier, i.e. it leads, in particular in the case of exclusive
supply, to foreclosure, and (2) as far as the distribution of final goods is concerned, since less
distributors will offer this good it will also lead to reduced intra-brand competition. In" the
case of wide .exclusive territories or in case of exclusive customer allocation the result may be
total elimination of intra-brand competition. In addition, when a selective distribution
agreement is used rather strictly, i.e. not many stores can carry the product, it also leads to
less in-store competition and reduced inter-brand competition. Furthermore, selective
distribution. contains a limitation on resale since approved dealers may only sell to end
consumers and other approved dealers.
Single-branding group
Under the heading of  single branding come those agreements/components that have as their
main element that the buyer is induced to col)centrate his orders for a particular type of good
with one supplier. The group comprises amongst others non-compete and quantity forcing on
the buyer, where an obligation or incentive scheme agreed between the supplier and the buyer
makes the latter purchase its requirements for a particular good or service and its substitutes
only or mainly from .one supplier.
There are two main effects on competition: (1) other suppliers in that market cannot sell to
the particular buyers, i.e. foreclosure of compeJing suppliers, and (2) as far as the distribution
of final goods is concerned, the particular retailers will only sell one brand, therefore there
will be no in-store competition in their shops. Both effects may lead to a reduction in inter-
brancLcompetition.
The reduction in inter-brand competition may be mitigated by stronger ex-ante competition
between suppliers to obtain the single branding contracts, but the longer the duration the more
likely it will be that this effect will not be strong enough to fully compensate for the lack of
inter-brand competition.
Resale-price maintenance group
Under the heading of  resale price maintenance (RPM) come those agreements/components
that have as their main element that the buyer is obliged or induced to resell not below a
certain price, at a certain price or not above a certain price. This group comprises minimum
fixed, maximum and recommended resale prices. Maximum and recommended resale prices
while unlikely to have negative effects, may work as fixed RPM. As RPM relates to the resale
price it is mainly relevant for the distribution of final goods.
There are two main effects of minimum and fixed RPM on competition: (1) the distributors
can no longer compete on price for that brand, leading to a total elimination of intra-brand
price competition, and (2) there is increased transparency on price and responsibility for price
changes, making horizontal collusion between manufacturers or distributors easier, at least in
concentrated markets. The reduction in intra-brand competition may, as it leads to lessdownward pressure on the price for the particular good, have as an indirect effect a reduced
level of inter-brand competition.
Marke- partitioning group
Under the heading 0:(  market partitioning come agreements/components that have as their
main element that the buyer is restricted as to where it either sources or resells a particular
good or that the supplier is restricted to whom it may sell its good. This group includes
exclusive purchasing, where an obligation or incentive scheme agreed between the supplier
and the buyer makes the latter purchase its requirements for a particular good or service
exclusively from the supplier, but leaving the buyer free to buy and sell competing goods or
services, It also includes territorial sales restrictions, customer sales restrictions, after-market
sales restrictions, prohibitions of resale and tying,
The main effect on competition is a reduction of intra-brand competition that may help the
supplier or the buyer (in case of after-market sales restrictions) to partitIon the market and
thus hinder market integration. This may facilitate price discrimination. Tying is slightly the
odd one out. Its main effect is that the buyers may pay a higher price for the tied good than
they would otherwise do but it may also lead to foreclosure of other suppliers and reduced
inter-brand competition in the market of the tied good.
Combinations of vertical restraints
The next question to be considered is whether a combination of different vertical restraints
increases the negative effects. In the Green Paper a rather prominent place is given to the
argument that certain combinations of vertical restraints are better for competition than their
use in isolation from each other? Although this may occasionally be the case, it does not
appear to be the general rule. In general the opposite seems true, a combination usually
aggravates the possible negative effects.
For example, a combination of single branding with exclusive distribution combines a
reduction of inter-brand competition with a reduction of intra-brand competition. In the case
of final goods a market is created with local brand monopolists without in-store competition.
Also, to foreclosure at manufacturer level is added foreclosure at the retail level. This means
that not only may it be difficult for a manufacturer to sell a new brand as stores are tied to one
brand, but also that new entrants to the retail market may have difficulty obtaining some of
the leading brands. This results in a situation where it may be both difficult to find outlets and
unprofitable to set up new outlets.
Another example is the combination of one of the restraints of the exclusive distribution
group like selective distribution with RPM. To the reduction of intra-brand competition of the
first is added the elimination of intra-brand price competition of the second. This quickly
leads to a total elimination of intra-brand competition. This elimination of intra-brand
competition may also help to sustain collusive tendencies between manufacturers facilitated
by RPM. In general, this combination does also not make sense from an efficiency point of
view as both protect the margin of the retailer. One of these restraints would normally suffice
to overcome, for example, a free rider problem between retailers.
Green Paper, point 67.A combination of one of the restraints of the single branding group with RPM may combine a
reduction of inter-brand competition resulting from a lack of in-store competition with a
facilitation of collusive behaviour between the manufacturers induced by RPM. Collusive
behaviour may become easier as the lack of in-store competition takes away some of the
competitive pressure. In addition, the reduction of inter-brand competition is combined with a
loss of intra-brand price competition resulting from RPM.
Finally, all combinations of vertical restraints which make arbitrage either by final customers
or by distributors more difficult, if not impossible, are negative from a market integration
perspective. Examples include the combination of: (1) territorial sales restriction
combined with selective distribution at the same level of distribution, (2) exclusive
distribution combined with exclusive purchasing, and (3) selective distribution combined
with exclusive purchasing.
Certain combinations may however be viewed more positively, because it can be argued that
one of the vertical restraints limits the possible negative effects of the other. In the
combination of exclusive distribution with maximum RPM the latter restraint may help the
supplier to limit possible price increases the buyer may want to implement under the
protection of the territorial exclusivity obtained. The same reasoning can be applied to the
combination of selective distribution and maximum RPM. Also the combination of exclusive
distribution with quantity forcing on the buyer may work in the same way as the latter may
prevent the distributor from raising his prices.
The positive effects
It is said that in a number of situations the usual arm s length dealings between manufacturer
and retailer, determining only price and quantity of a certain transaction, lead to a sub-optimal
level of investments and sales. The following generalisations can be made about this:
The first and main reason why this - i.e. a sub-optimal level of investments and sales - is
supposed to happen is the existence of some form of  free-rider problem. The person who
makes an effort may not be able to appropriate all the benefits his or her effort engenders
and may therefore be inclined to invest sub-optimally. This may be the result of free
riding by one retailer on the promotion efforts of another retailer. Exclusive distribution
or similar restrictions or RPM may be helpful in avoiding such free riding. Free-riding
can also occur between manufacturers where one invests in promotion in the shops for
its brand, thereby also attracting customers for its competitors. Non-compete type
restraints can help to overcome this latter type offree-riding.
For there to be a problem there needs to be a real free-rider issue, something that is not
always so obvious. Free-riding between retailers can only occur on pre-sales services
and not on after-sales services. The good needs to be relatively new or technically
complex as the customer otherwise may very well know what he wants from past
purchases. And the good must be of a reasonably high value as it is otherwise not
attractive for a customer to go to one shop for information and to another to buy. On top
of this, when all these conditions are fulfilled it must not be practical for themanufacturer to agree with the retailers effective service requirements conceming the
pre-sales services
Free-riding between manufacturers is also limited by rather strict conditions. Where a
product is promoted by the manufacturer through national advertising there seems to be
little scope for a free-rider issue to arise that could be addressed through non-compete
obligations imposed on the distributors. Only in case the promotion takes place in
certain retail outlets could a non-compete type agreement help capture the full benefits.
In addition, it can only occur on pre-sales service, it must not be possible to make the
promotion brand specific and is only likely for relatively new and complex products .
customers may otherwise already very well know what they want.
A second general point that needs to be made concerns the  possible divergence between
what is privately efficient and what is efficient from a total welfare/consumer point of
view. What is privately efficient is not always good for total welfare. To go back to the
free-riding between retailers or between manufacturers. Let us suppose .a real free-rider
problem exists and sales can be expanded by inducing more pre-sales services although
this would also lead to higher prices. When these extra services are valued equally by ,
the majority of consumers this may very well lead to higher total welfare. But when the
infra-marginal consumers (that is those who are already buying at the current
price/service level) know what they want and do not appreciate the extra service, they
only suffer from the higher price, especially if there is insufficient inter-brand
competition. It may be privately efficient to increase the service level to .attract more
marginal consumers and thereby increase sales, but total welfare may nonetheless suffer.
A special form of free-riding is  the certification free-rider issue. The hypothesis is that
certain retailers perform a valuable service by identifYing "good" products. The fact that
these retailers sell a certain product signifies to the consumer that it is .a good buy. This
hypothesis may .sometimes be useful for explaining the introduction of new products.
New and complex products are first stocked by high-quality, high-margin stores where
they are bought by avant-garde consumers. Gradually its reputation becomes established
and demand grows enough for it to be sold through low-price chains. If the manufacturer
cannot initially limit its sales to the premium stores, it runs the risk of being delisted and
the product introduction may fail. If this is true, a problem analogous to invention patent
protection exists. It may be necessary to provide temporary protection against price
discounters to help the introduction of the product. However, a period of protection
which is too long may only delay the product moving into the mature, price-competitive
stages of its life cycle, to the disadvantage of consumers. This means, at best, that there
may be a reason to' allow for a limited duration a restriction of the exclusive
distribution or RPM kind; enough to guarantee introduction, but not so long as to hinder
large-scale dissemination.
Yet another special form of free riding is the so-called  hold-up' problem . Sometimes
there are specific investments to be made by either the supplier or the buyer, such as in
special equipment or training. In such a case, after the investments have been made the
investor becomes to a certain extent prisoner to the other side. The balance of power will
The standard argument against contractability of service requirements is that the costs of monitoring and
the contract costs may be prohibitive for the manufacturer in case of a large number of small retailers.shift. In fear of this the necessary investments may not be made, unless  ex-ante  supply
arrangements can be fixed. The investor fears that the other side will free ride on its
investment. However, as in the free riding example between retailers, there are a number
of conditions which have to be met before such a risk is real. First, the investment must
be sunk and specific to deal with that other party only. Secondly, it must be a long-term
investment which is not recouped in the short run. And thirdly, the investment must be
asymmetric; i.e. one invests more than the other. Only when these conditions are met
. can there be a real reason to have - a vertical restraint for a limited duration, of the non-
compete type when the investment is made by the supplier and of the exclusive
distribution or exclusive supply type when the investment is made by the buyer.
The last reason for sub-optimal sales that should be mentioned, is the problem of
double marginalisation . In case both the manufacturer and the retailer have market
power each will set its price above marginal cost. They both add their margin that
exceeds the one that WOlllC: exist under competition. This may result in a final price that
even exceeds the monopoly price an integrated company would charge, to the detriment
of their collective profits and consumers. In this case quantity forcing on the buyer or
maximum RPM could help the manufacturer bring the price down to monopoly level.
In the economic literature it is explained that there is a large measure of substitutability
between the different vertical restraints. This means that the same inefficiency problem
can be solved by different vertical restraints. For example, as explained above, the
problem of free-riding between retailers or the certification free-rider problem can be
solved by means of exclusive distribution or fixed or minimum RPM. This is of
importance as the negative effects on competition may differ between the various
vertical restraints. This plays a role when indispensability is discussed under
Article 85(3). As RPM is generally considered to be less acceptable from a competition
point of view this is a reason only to allow exclusive distribution or other less serious
restraints and not RPM.
General rules for the evaluation of vertical restraints
In evaluating vertical restraints from a competition policy perspective, some general rules can
be formulated.
As a first general rule it can be said that vertical. restraints which reduce inter-brand
competition are generally more harmful than vertical restraints that only reduce intra-brand
competition. For example, non-compete obligations are likely to have more net negative
effects than exclusive distribution. The former, by foreclosing other brands, may prevent
these brands from reaching the market. The latter, while foreclosing certain buyers, does not
in general, prevent the good from reaching the final consumer.
A second general rule is that exclusive agreements are generally worse for competition than
non-exclusive agreements. Exclusive agreements make, by the ~xpress language of the
, contracts or their practical effects, one party fulfil all or practically all its requirements from
another party. For~example, a nOn compete obligation makes that the buyer purchases
only one brand, while quantity forcing leaves the buyer scope to purchase competing
goods. The degree of foreclosure is therefore different, while often the efficiencies are
remarkably similar.A third general rule that can be formulated is that the possible negative effects of vertical
restraints are reinforced when not just one supplier with its buyers practices a certain vertical
restraint but when also other suppliers and their buyers organise their trade in a similar way.
These so called cumulative effects may be a problem in a number of sectors. To make a valid
assessment of the effects of a cumulation of vertical agreements requires a sector wide
investigation and overview. The issue of withdrawal of the proposed BE Regulation is
reviewed in section V -3 and will be further developed in the guidelines.
In addition to these three general rules some further points can be made:
Restraints agreed for intermediate goods are in general less harmful than restraints
affecting the distribution of final goods. As intermediate goods are not sold to final
consumers but are used as an input, brand and image are less important. This makes a
possible loss of intra-brand competition less important. This distinction between
intermediate and final goods and services will be taken up in guidelines.
Within the RPM group, fixed and minimum price maintenance are serious restraints.
Maximum and recommended prices, when really maximum or recommended, are not
considered to be restrictive of competition.
Within the market-partitioning group restriction of resale and after-market sales
restrictions seem the worst as they allow market partitioning without clear possible
efficiencies. "Tying" is in general considered a somewhat less serious restriction. It
concerns the possible extension of market power from one market into another.
Possible efficiency arguments ("need to assure the buyer uses the right sort of input
for the fragile machine we sold him as breakdowns may hurt our products image" or
joint delivery is cost saving ) may be limited. Exclusive purchasing, i.e. the
obligation to source directly from one supplier without a restriction on selling
competing brands, is the least serious restriction within this group.
RPM is usually considered to be more restrictive than the other vertical restraints. In
case of efficiencies it can often be replaced by less competition distorting restraints
with similar positive effects. This is reflected by the current policy in most countries
which tends to be very strict on RPM while allowing exclusive distribution in certain
market conditions.
Community competition policy, with its emphasis on the necessity to protect arbitrage
and the general prohibition on resale restrictions, reflects the concern to further
market integration.SECTION IV: MARKET SHARE THRESHOLDS AND LEGAL CERTAINTY
Existing block-exemptions
The present block-exemption regulations (exclusive distribution, exclusive purchasing and
franchising) follow a legalistic clause-based approach where the focus is on the freedom of
action of dealers and on intra-brand competition between dealers belonging to the same
distribution system. Apart uom the withdrawal system and the possible application of
Article 86, the exemptions are granted for aU companies irrespective of market power.
This system exempts uom Article 85(1), without distinction
, .
companies with 1 % and 100%
market share even for non-compete obligations and certain combinations of vertical restraints
such as exclusive and selective distribution (see franchising regulation). It leads to the result
that small operators (the vast majority of companies) suffer unnecessarily strict regulation
while companies with significant market power can protect themselves simply by drafting the
contract clauses so as to fit within the existing block-exemption regulations. 
The Commission can withdraw the benefit of these exemption regulations only with effect for
the futllre. Companies with market power can apply the most serious restrictions until the
Commission adopts a prohibition decision. There is no pressure on companies to change their
agreements or conduct because they effectively enjoy provisional validity for their contracts.
Therefore, the preventive effect ofthe prohibition system of Article 85(1) is lost. Irreparable
damage to competition can be caused without any remedy for the past (e.g. market foreclosure
through exclusive dealings). At the same time, smaller operators are prevented uom using
vertical restraints in an innovative way to improve their competitive position on the market.
This hinders the development of new dynamic forms of distribution. Therefore the existing
block-exemption regulations cannot be carried forward.
Economic approach and market-share thresholds
Two policy conclusions can be drawn from the economic learning described in the previous
section: firstly, in the absence of  market power, a presumption of legality for vertical
restraints can be made except for certain hardcore restrictions; secondly, when market power
exists, no general presumption of legality can be made. Therefore, it makes economic sense to
use market-share thresholds to limit the application of a block-exemption regulation.
It is clear that market share is not a substitute for market power. In an individual case the
establishment of an inuingement in respect of a particular vertical restraint can normally only
be assessed by looking at all aspects of market structure and market behaviour. However,
such a market analysis imposes significant enforcement costs on the competition authority
and cannot be applied to every single case.
It is possible to make two policy assumptions that assist in this market analysis. First, in the
majority of cases a market share of 20% is normally insufficient to bring about net negative
effects on competition that would result uom vertical restraints practised by a single firm.
Secondly, for certain vertical restraints in the light of significant efficiencies a
block-exemption up to 40% market share, which is the level at which a risk of dominance
starts, can be envisaged. Above that level there is a risk that the last condition of Article 85(3)is no longer fulfilled. Accordingly, the use  of  market-share thresholds in a block-exemption
regulation does not establish an infringement but serves to exclude certain categories of
vertical restraints from the application of Article 85(1) by applying Article 85(3).
By working with these two policy assumptions based on market share only, the Commission
is aware that it may exempt certain agreements that do not justify exemption. The higJ;Ier the
market shares used the higher that risk will be. The\. Commission considers that the
market-share thresholds of  20%  and 40% linked to the nature of the vertical restraint and the
importance  of  efficiencies involved are appropriate levels for a future block-exemption
regulation. However, the exact level of the market-share thresholds and the question of
whether one should only work with one threshold instead of two will be reconsidered by the
Commission in the course  of  the consultation on the BE and the guidelines (see explanation
following hereafter). The Commission intends to maintain the withdrawal mechanism for the
rare cases where a serious competition problem may arise below these levels of market
shares.. The withdrawal mechanism will in particular be applied in cumulative effect cases
(see Section V for further details).
Nobody has been able to suggest a better single indicator than market share for use in a
. block-exemption regulation. The only alternative would be to only work with guidelines that
would make it possible to use the full set of market factors for the assessment of vertical
restraints. The Commission considers that this would, at the present stage, represent too
radical a change and afford industry a lower level of legal certainty than the use of a
block-exemption with market-share thresholds.
Competition rules are economic rules that by their very nature involve a certain degree 
legal uncertainty. Companies holding market power are exposed to the risk of violating the
competition rules. The Commission pursues the objective to create a reasonable level of legal
certainty for industry that is compatible with the efficient protection  of  competition. The use
of market-share thresholds makes it possible to create the link between a more economic
approach and legal certainty.
Market shares are not an unknown phenomenon in the Community competition rules.
Industry has been living for many years with market-share tb.resholds which dispense with
notification (see the 15% market share in Article 4(2) of Council Regulation No 17), create a
presumption of negative clearance (see the  10%  market share in the Notice on agreements of
minor importance  or  the 25% market share threshold in the Merger Regulation)  or  grant a
block-exemption (see the 10% and 20% market-share thresholds in Regulations (EEC)
No 417/859 and (EEC)No 418/85 ). This has not created an intolerable level  of  legal
uncertainty for industry.
Commission Regulation (EEC) 1'!6 417/85 of 19 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of
the Treaty to categories of specialisation agreements;  OJ  L 53, 22. 1985. p. I.
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 418/85 of 19 December 1984 on the application of Article 85(3) of
the Treaty to categories of research and development agreements;  OJ  L 53, 22.2. 1985, p, 5.Market-share cap a condition for a wider block-exemption
Under the present system the majority of vertical agreements are not covered by any
block-exemption regulation. Only goods for resale are covered as far as exclusive
distribution, exclusive purchasing and franchising are concerned. Except for cars, selective
distribution is not covered by any block-exemption. There is no block-exemption for
services (except for franchising), for intermediate goods or for goods undergoing
processing. To the extent that a block-exemption applies, it sets out which clauses are
exempted (white-list approach) with the consequence that everything else is not exempted.
This approach limits the scope of application of the existing block-exemptions and results in
excessive regulation for industry. At the moment, the majority of companies are not covered
by any block-exemption and thus either take the risk of not notifying or of notifying and
accepting in most cases a comfort letter from the Commission.
The Commission wants to correct this situation by considerably widening the existing
block-exemptions to include services, intermediate goods, goods for resale combined with
transformation and selective distribution. It also wants to largely replace the present white-list
approach by a black-list approach. The Commission considers that this will ultimately give
legal certainty to more companies than the present narrow clause-based block-exemption
approach. With a much wider block-exemption, it is, however, impossible to continue
exempting irrespective of market power. The Commission therefore intends to work in its
future Block-Exemption Regulation with two parameters: the nature of the vertical restraint
and the level of market power involved.
No presumption of illegality above the market-share cap
The Commission recognises that the use of a market-share cap will create a certain degree of
uncertainty for companies as to the application of the BE regulation. This is due to the
difficulty of defining markets and assessing a company s position on the relevant product and
geographic market. It also results from the volatility of market shares that change over time.
However, this legal uncertainty is mitigated by the following two elements:
The use of market-share thresholds  does not create a presumption of illegality above
the market-share cap. The market-share threshold will (mly operate as a safe harbour
to distinguish the agreements that are presumed to be legal from those which may
require individual examination. In respect of the latter, the Commission will continue
to bear the burden of proof that the agreement in question does violate Article 85(1)
and will have to examine whether the agreement does fulfil the conditions of Article
85(3). This is the normal situation of an agreement not covered by a block-exemption
regulation. Above the threshold, three situations can thus arise: negative clearance
individual exemption or a prohibition  ex tunc  if the conditions of Article 85(3) are
not fulfilled.
Companies will need to know what policy the Commission is going to apply above
the thresholds. The Commission therefore intends to issue  a set of guidelines which
should basically cover three issues: the scope of Article 85(1) above the market-share
cap, the Commission s policy under Article 85(3) and its policy of withdrawal of thebenefit of the block-exemption, particularly in cumulative-effect cases. These
guidelines should set out clear and simple rules so as to allow companies to make in
most cases their own assessment under Article 85(1) and (3). The objective must be to
reduce the enforcement cost for industry and to eliminate as far as possible
notifications of agreements that do not raise any serious competition problem.
Since the BE regulation uses market-share thresholds combined with a more economic
approach to vertical restraints, less agreements will be covered by Article 85(1). A consistent
application of the guidelines and the publication of leading decisions will further increase the
level of legal certainty for industry.
Revision of Article 4(2) of Regulation No 17
If a company makes a mistake in assessing its market share, it should not be punished for the
fact that it has not notified its agr~ement. At present the Commission can only exempt back to
the date of notification. Therefore, if a contract infringed Article 85(1) and has not been
notified, a national judge may declare the contract null and void for the sole reason that it has
not been notified, even if all the conditions of Article 85(3) are fulfilled.
To change that situation it will be necessary  to modify Article 4(2) of Council Regulation
No 17 so that all vertical distribution agreements can be exempted retroactively when
notification takes place at a later date. Such a change will have several beneficial effects:
where a company has made a mistake in the assessment of its market share and is not
covered by the block-exemption, the Commission will be able to exempt retroactively
provided all the conditions of Article 85(3) were fulfilled from the beginning;
it will eliminate artificial litigation before national courts, where the competition rules
are often invoked to escape from contractual obligations even though there is no real
competition problem; this will strengthen the civil enforceability of contracts by
putting the emphasis on protection of competition instead of protection of private
interests often unrelated to competition;
it will reduce the number of notifications presently occurring with a view to obtaining
legal certainty; companies will not have to notify in advance to obtain the benefit of
an individual exemption, but can make their own assessment under Article 85(1)
and (3) and avoid the cost of notification unless they have a real doubt , about the
applicability of Article 85(3); this reduction in notifications is very likely to occur, as
is evident from those agreements already covered by Article 4(2) of Regulation No 17
which are not normally notified. This will allow the Commission to reduce the
advance control system based on notifications and to concentrate, together with the
competition authorities of Member States .on the more important cases, thereby
increasing the efficiency of the Community competition rules. The objective is to
reduce the enforcement costs to industry and to eliminate as far as possible
notifications which do not raise any serious competition problems.Legal certainty will be further enhanced by the following additional elements:
cumula~ive effects resulting from networks of vertical restraints will only be subject to
the withdrawal system, with effect for the future;
in the event of a dual-threshold system the agreements of SMEs will be subject to
the higher market~share cap. However, they will remain subject to withdrawal and
hardcore restrictions;






coverage by the future block-exemption will be based on the relevant antitrust
market as explained in the Commission Notice on market definition II
the market share will be based on data for the preceding financial year;
the market share can be calculated on the basis of sales volume where there is
insufficient data on sales value;
agreements remain covered by the block-exemption regulation for a period
of two years as long as the threshold is not exceeded by more than
5% market share;
if the threshold is exceeded, including the 5% increase referred to in point (iv),
a grace period of one year will apply during which period the block-exemption
regulation will continue to .apply; the grace period would start in the year
following the financial year in which the threshold was exceeded;
in general, it will only be necessary to estimate the market share of the supplier, as it is
this market share that decides wHether an agreement is block exempted or not.
Hov.:ever, in cases of exclusive supply the market share of the buyer may have to be
used as the relevant indicator. In addition, the guidelines will address the issue of how
the Commission will take account of the buyer s market position in the analysis of
individual cases.
It is recognised that these measures vvill not create absolute legal certainty. However, a more
economic approach is incompatible with absolute legal certainty. The aim of the present
revision exercise is to bring about .a new balance between a more economic approach and a
reasonable level of legal certainty. This new approach is ultimately to the benefit of smaller
operators \\'ithout market power which are the vast majority of companies. It will also be to
the benefit of bigger companies operating in competitive markets. However, companies
\\'ith significant market power which would practice anti-competitive vertical restraints
\\-ill be subjected to stricter control to the benefit of competition, other competitors and
finally consumers.
Commission Notice on the definition of rele\'ant market 1(1f the rurposes of Community competition
1~!\\(()JC37::'. l::', ll)l)7 r:'1
., "Increased decentralisation
Under the existing BE regulation, there is very little scope for decentralised application of the
Community competition rules. If a company drafts its agreement in accordance with the
BE regulations there is no scope for the application of Article 85(2) by the national
competition authorities  or  the national courts, because all companies are covered up to  100%
market share and only the Commission has the power to withdraw the benefit  of  those BE
regulations. Therefore, while the existing block-exemptions apply third parties have no other
course  of  action than to bring a complaint to the Commission.
Under the new proposed BE regulation, decentralised application of the Community
competition rules is opened up for national competition authorities and courts above the
market share threshold(s) of the BE regulation. In addition it is proposed to give national
competition authorities the power to withdraw the benefit of the BE regulation in their
territory if the conditions of Article 85(3) are no longer fulfilled.
The Commission will closely cooperatC' with national competition authorities and courts to
assist them in the increased application of Article 85. This cooperation is already operational
since the adoption of the notices on cooperation with national competition authorities 12 and
national courts 13
Notice on cooperation between national competition authorities and the Commission in applying
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty,  OJ  C 313 15. 10. 1997, p. 3.
Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission in applying Articles 85 and 86 of
the EC Treaty,  OJ  C 39. 13. 1993. p, 6.SECTION V: POLICY PROPOSAL
Different options
During the Green Paper exercise the policy options described in Section II (see in particular
the Table in ILl) were reviewed. Most of these are not acceptable as they would not solve the
three major shortcomings of current policy: form-based strait-jacket regulation, neglect of
market power and block-exemptions which are too narrow.
Option I of the Green Paper retains all these shortcomings. Options II and IV -I reduce the
strait-jacket effect but increase the neglect of market power. The umbrella block-exemption
without market shares takes the neglect of market power to the extreme. Option m and
Option IV-II do take account of market power but do stay too much with narrow
block-exemptions with a strait-jacket effect.
Two other options, fundamentally different from the one that is proposed below, would not
solve the main drawbacks of the current policy. The first, which relies on a single black
clause block-exemption without market-share thresholds, would confer provisional validity
upon vertical agreements, subject only to withdrawal with effect for the future. This solution
would lead to the elimination of the preventive effect which is inherent in the prohibition
system provided for by Article 85 and based on the  ex tunc  nullity of anti-competitive
practices. It should be recalled that such .a preventive effect plays a fundamental role in
ensuring .effective compliance by the companies and, ultimately, sound competition
conditions. The second option that is not acceptable is to start from the presumption that
vertical restraints (subject to hardcor~lare in general not anti-competitive and thus can be
covered by a wide negative-clearance regulation, the benefit of which can be taken away with
retroactive effect in cases where competition is distorted without any offsetting gains in
efficiency. This general positive presumption is supported neither by economic thinking nor
enforcement .experience. Furthermore, it would result in increased legal uncertainty for
industry. In fact, as there would be no market-share limits that would create a safe harbour the
national courts, the national competition authorities and the Commission could all
retroactively declare the negative clearance inapplicable at any level of market power.
The proposed new policy
As was explained in the introduction, future policy should avoid the three major shortcomings
of current policy. The new policy should first and foremost protect competition and
market integration. It should also provide a reasonable level of legal certainty for business
result in acceptable enforcement costs for industry and the competition authorities and
increase decentralisation.
In order to avoid the shortcomings and strike the right balance between these different
objectives, a profound change of policy is necessary. The main characteristics of the proposed
policy are the following:The basis is one, very wide, Block-Exemption regulation ("the Block-Exemption ) that
covers all vertical restraints concerning intermediate and final goods .and services, except
for a limited number of hardcore restraints. This solves the shortcoming of
block-exemptions which are too narrow.
It is based mainly on a black-clause approach, i.e. defining what is not block-exempted
instead of defining what is exempted. This removes the strait-jacket effect.
It makes use of market-share caps to link the exemption to market power. The issue of
whether one or two market-share thresholds should be used has not yet been decided. A
single-threshold system has advantages in terms of clarity and simplicity . A
dual-threshold system allows an economically justified gradation in the treatment of
vertical restraints reflecting differences in their likely anti-competitive effects. Below
such thresholds it is assumed that vertical restraints have no significant net negative
effects. This means that the agreements either fall outside Article 85(1) or, when falling
within Article 85(1), with the exception of the hardcore restraints, may 
block-exempted. The hardcore restraints are mainly related to resale price maintenance
and to restrictions on resale which are deemed not to justify block-exemption in the light
of the market integration objective. 
In case of a single-threshold system the threshold would lie in the range of 25-35%
market share, clearly below what is usually perceived as the level of dominance. In case
of a dual-threshold system the first and main market-share cap would be around 20%.
Above the 20% threshold there is room to exempt certain vertical restraints up to .a higher
level of around 40%. Such an approach with market share(s) takes away the shortcoming
of neglect of market power and, by eliminating the vast majority of notifications
probably 80 to 90% of all cases, it will allow the Commission and the national
competition authorities to concentrate on the important cases.
It will create a safe harbour to distinguish the agreements that are presumed to be legal
from those which may require individual examination. Vertical restraints falling outside
the safe harbour will not be presumed to be illegal but may need individual examination.
In respect of agreements that fall outside the BE the Commission will continue to bear
the burden of proof that the agreement in question does infringe Article ,85(1) and will
have to examine whether the agreement does fulfil the conditions of Article 85(3). This is
the normal situation for an agreement not covered by a block-exemption regulation.
Above the threshold, three situations may arise: negative clearance, individual exemption
or prohibition if the conditions of Article 85(3) are not fulfilled. The proposed policy will
provide for guidelines detailing the Commission s policy concerning individual negative
clearance, exemption or prohibition above the market-share thresholds and possible
withdrawal of the Block-Exemption below the thresholds.
In the course of consultation on this document a majority of the Member States expressed a preference
for a single-threshold system.There will be a number of flanking measures as outlined in the previous section. The
most important one is the extension of Article 4(2) of Regulation 17 to all vertical
distribution agreements 15. Taken together as a package with the other elements of the
proposal, i.e. the fact that this very wide Block-Exemption will cover many agreements
that are not presently covered by a block-exemption, the possible gradation in exemption
and guidelines, the overall level of legal certainty for industry will be improved.
It will be compatible with improved decentralisation. National courts and national
competition authorities will be able to apply the Block-Exemption, and, with the help' of
guidelines, apply Article 85(1) above the market-share thresholds. Furthermore, if
Article 85(1) is not applicable because there is no appreciable effect on trade between the
Member States or on competition, the BE will not apply. It is also proposed that the
national competition authorities, on the basis of clear and well specified criteria, would
have the power to withdraw the benefit of the BE Regulation in respect of their territory.
This more economic approach is based upon the investigations made for the Green Paper, a
careful analysis of all the comments received on the Green Paper, the Commission
experience in past vertical cases, Court judgments and study of the relevant economic and
legal literature.
Specific points
The following specific points can be made about the proposed new policy:
The proposal will contain a list of  hardcore restrictions that always fall outside the
Block-Exemption. This list will in any event include agreements concerning minimum
and fixed resale prices and absolute territorial protection. In addition, the Commission
proposes to protect the possibility of arbitrage by intermediate and final purchasers to a
greater extent and therefore to blacklist more generally resale restrictions in so far as
these restrictions result from factors under the control of the parties. The following may
then be defined as hardcore restrictions that would fall outside the Block-Exemption:
(1) fixed resale prices or minimum resale prices;
(2) maximum resale prices or recommended resale prices which in reality amount
to fixed or minimum resale prices as a result of a pressure exercised by any of
the parties;
(3) the prevention or restriction of active or passive resales, imports or exports to final
or non-final buyers, other than (a) the restriction on active sales in the territory of
an exclusive distributor, (b) the restriction on active sales to exclusively allocated
customers, (c) the restriction on members of a selective distribution system from
selling to unauthorised distributors, and (d) the restriction on the buyer of
intermediate goods and/or services from selling these to other direct or indirect
buyers of the .supplier;
A draft of the required Council Regulation is jointly submitted with this Communication.(4) the prevention or restriction of cross-supplies between distributors at the same or
different levels of distribution in an exclusive or selective distribution system or
'between distributors of these different systems of distribution: i. e. exclusive or
selective distribution combined with exclusive purchasing;
(5) the combination, at the same level of distribution, of selective distribution and
exclusive distribution containing a prohibition or restriction on active selling;
(6) the combination, at the same level of distribution, of selective distribution and
exclusive customer allocation;
(7) an obligation on the supplier of an intermediate good not to sell the same good as a
repair or replacement good to the independent aftermarket.
Where a  single-threshold system is chosen, all the non-hardcore vertical restraints are
covered below this threshold.
Where a  dual-threshold system is chosen, the non-hardcore vertical restraints including
the more serious ones are subject to the first and main threshold of 20% market share.
These include the restraints that lead to a form of exclusivity like exclusive supply,
exclusive customer allocation and non-compete. As explained in section III, exclusive
vertical restraints are in general more likely to have significant 'anti~competitive effects
than non-exclusive restraints, while the latter may often achie,:,e the. same efficiencies. To
the extent that selective distribution falls within Article 85(1), it is also subject to this
threshold in view of its considerable potential to reduce both intra and inter-brand
competition. Tying also falls under this threshold. The first threshold covers all possible
vertical restraints and combinations of vertical restraints unless otherwise stated.
Again assuming a dual-threshold system, the second threshold of 40% would cover
vertical restraints that, on the basis of the economic thinking or past policy experience
lead to less serious restrictions of competition. Firstly, one finds here the non-exclusive
type of agreements such as quantity forcing on buyer or supplier. As they leave room for
dealing with others they are less serious than their exclusive counterparts. Two exclusive
types of agreement are also subject to this threshold: (1) exclusive distribution, as it does
not directly harm inter-brand competition and often has efficiencies, and (2) exclusive
purchasing, as it does not lead to foreclosure or a direct reduction of inter-brand
competition. Lastly, this threshold would also apply to agreements between SMEs.
It is proposed to impose a duration limit on non-compete agreements in view of the
possible serious foreclosure effects connected with non-compete obligations. The
Commission is also considering imposing a duration limit for exclusive purchasing
combined with quantity forcing on the buyer. The Commission is further considering
dispensing with the duration limits in the particular cases where the supplier owns the
premises from which the buyer operates or in equivalent situations. The guidelines
will take account of the particular relationship between long term investments and
duration limits.There are a number of vertical agreements that are generally considered or would in the
future be considered to fall outside Article 85. These include qualitative selective
distribution, service requirements and maximum and recommended resale prices if they
do not amount to fixed RPM.
* As was indicated at the end of Section ill the possible negative effects of vertical
restraints are reinforced when a number of suppliers and their buyers practice a certain
vertical restraint. These cumulative effects may be a problem in a number of sectors.
Making a valid assessment of the effects of such a cumulation of vertical agreements may
require a sector-wide investigation and overview. In general only a competition authority
can be expected to gather such sector-wide information, as it may not be readily available
to individual companies. It also seems fair to treat all companies the same if they add
significantly to the total effect. Such cases of cumulative effect, where the individual
suppliers are covered by the Block-Exemption, will be addressed by withdrawal of the
Block-Exemption with effect for the future. It is proposed that not only the Commission
but also the national competition authorities will have the power to withdraw the benefits
of the BE.
The Commission will indicate when withdrawal is unlikely and when withdrawal is
likely. It is proposed that withdrawal would be unlikely when less than a certain
proportion of the market is foreclosed through similar agreements and would also be
unlikely when the individual firm s market share is below a certain level.
According to the Commission s experience, the possible negative outcome resulting from
the cumulative effect of the same type of vertical restraints are especially at issue in the
field of selective distribution. To address this problem, it is proposed that the
Block-Exemption may be declared inapplicable to companies operating a selective
distribution system on a market where more than two-thirds of the total sales is
channelled through parallel networks of selective distribution. As the companies
concerned may not be in possession of such a .sector-wide information, it is proposed that
this condition would not operate automatically. The future Block-Exemption Regulation
would provide that the CQmmission would, at its own initiative, establish that the
aforesaid condition is fulfilled in respect of a specific market and fix a transition period
at the expiry of which the Block-Exemption would no longer be applicable to selective
distribution agreements relating to that market. Such a transitional period should not be
shorter than six months. The Commission will publish a decision to this effect in the
Official Journal.
The choice has been made to propose one wide block-exemption regulation instead of
different regulations .for specific forms of vertical restraints or sectors. It thus treats
different forms of vertical restraints having similar effects in a .similar way, preventing
unjustified differentiation between forms or sectors. In this way it is avoided, to the
greatest extent possible, to have a policy bias in the choice companies make concerning
their formats of distribution. The company s choice should be based on commercial merit
and not on unjustified differences in exemptability. This has a number of consequences
that are spelled out in the next points.It is proposed to cover selective distribution in the Block-Exemption regulation. Care has
. been taken to stay as close as possible to the current policy as formulated in past
Commission decisions and Court judgments. This means that the supplier, in order to be
covered by the BE, may not exclude  a priori  certain forms of distribution and may only
apply selective distribution on condition that the nature of the good or service requires
such a type of distribution and the selection criteria are implemented objectively and in a
non-discriminatory manner. The supplier may also not specify the identity of competing
brands to be sold by the authorised distributor.
Vertical agreements relating to the manufacture of goods, in particular when they involve
the use of know how or patents, are not covered. Licence agreements covered by
Regulation (EEe) No 240/9616 on the transfer oftechnology will be outside the scope of
the future BE regulation. The subject matter of the 1979 Notice on subcontracting17 also
remains outside the scope of the BE regulation. However, vertical agreements relating to
the supply of goods, produced on the basis of specifications given by the buyer to the
supplier, but not involving the use of know-how or patent rights of the buyer for the
manufacture of these goods, will be covered.
As regards vertical agreements relating to the distribution or supply of goods or services
it is proposed that the BE regulation cover intellectual property rights to the extent that
these do not relate to the manufacture of goods and are (1) indispensable for and
complementary to those agreements which are exempted, and (2) contain obligations
which are not more restrictive of competition than those vertical restraints which are
exempted under the draft BE Regulation. This relates to restrictions on the use and
application of intellectual property rights in the context of vertical agreements covered by
the future block-exemption regulation.
Agreements where the buyer of software on-sells this software to the final consumer
without obtaining any copyright over it are considered as agreements for the supply of
goods for resale for the purposes of this BE. The treatment of software agreements
beyond this requires further consideration.
Franchising, while being covered, will not be given any preferential treatment in the
Block-Exemption regulation as it is a combination of vertical restraints. Usually
franchising is a combination of selective distribution and non-compete obligations in
relation to goods which are the subject matter of the franchise. Sometimes, other
elements like a location clause or territorial exclusivity are added. These combinations
will be treated according to the general criteria set forth in the BE.
Certain distribution forms - in particular franchising - involve the licensing of
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). In franchising, the transfer of IPR is an essential
element of this distribution format and is used to assimilate the commercial practises of
the franchisee as closely as possible to those of the franchisor. This licensing may include
restrictions which are necessary or complementary to the vertical restraints placed on the
Commission Regulation (EC) No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of Article 85(3) to
certain categories of technology transfer agreements, OJ L 32, 9. 1996, p. 2.
Notice on subcontracting agreements" OJ C 1 1.1979, p. 2.sale of the goods or services. While vertical restraints on the goods or services are
important from a competition perspective and may result in a franchise agreement falling
within the scope of Article 85(1), these necessary or complementary restraints must be
examined in the light of the need to protect the know-how provided or the maintenance
of the network' s identity and reputation
The Block-Exemption Regulation will not cover vertical agreements between actual or
potential competitors, except where the agreement is a non-reciprocal one and no party
has an annual turnover exceeding ECU 100 million.
It is further proposed that the Block-Exemption Regulation will cover the vertical
agreements of associations of independent retailers when the individual members of the
association are SMEs as defined in the Annex to Commission
Recommendation  96/280IEC.  In the case of a dual-threshold system these agreements -
would fall under the lower threshold. What is contemplated here are retailers who
associate themselves under a common format to sell to final consumers. It is recognised
that there are horizontal aspects to these associations and the coverage by the BE is
subject to the proviso that these horizontal aspects do not infringe Article 85.
For reasons of coherence and unity of policy it is proposed not to retain sector specific
rules for beer and petroll9. There are insufficient economic or legal reasons to continue to
have a special regime for these sectors. In as far as sector specific treatment is justified
this will be taken into account in the guidelines.
It is proposed not to apply the rule of severability but to make the exemption of
agreements dependent on all the provisions in the BE being complied with:
A transitional period for the adaptation of existing agreements to the BE is anticipated
but remains to be determined.
Conclusions
The proposed new policy will create a more efficient protection of competition by allowing
the competition authorities to concentrate their efforts on those cases involving market power.
It will do away with the strait-jacket effect of current regulation and will reduce the
enforcement costs imposed on industry. The smaller operators, especially, will benefit from
this and from the enhanced level of legal certainty.
There are four pillars on which this new policy is based:
one broad umbrella Block-Exemption Regulation applying to both goods and services
with market-share threshold(s) and a black-list approach;
guidelines detailing the policy above the thresholds and possible withdrawal of the BE;
See  Pronllptia  Schillgalis Case 16l/84, (1986) ECR 353, paras 23-24.
The Block-Exemption regulation on .car distribution, which expires in 2002, is not covered by the
current proposal.the adjustment of Article 4(2) of Regulation 17 to reduce the number of notifications, to
stop artificial litigation before national courts and strengthen the civil enforceability of contracts; 
an increase in the role of national competition authorities and national courts in the
application of Article 85(1) above the market-share thresho14s and the withdrawal of the
BE below the thresholds.SECTION VI: PROCEDURE
Legislative changes
Implementation of the policy proposal outlined in Section V will require three new legislative
texts, namely two Council amending regulations extending the Commission s powers under
Regulation No 19/65/EEC2o and amending Article 4(2) of Regulation No 17, and a
Commission block-exemption regulation covering all vertical restraints in almost all sectors
of distribution.
The first Council amending regulation is required to grant the Commission the power to
declare by way of a block-exemption regulation that Article 85(1) shall not apply to certain
categories of vertical agreements entered into between economic operators. This is because
the current enabling regulation (Regulation No 19/65/EEC) is restricted to a limited number
of vertical restraints, namely, exclusive distribution of goods for resale, exclusive purchase of
goods for resale, obligations in respect of exclusive supply and exclusive purchase for resale
and restrictions imposed in relation to the assignment or use of industrial property rights. It is
also limited to agreements entered into between two parties.
The second Council amending regulation relates to the amendment of Article 4(2) 
Regulation No 17, the First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 ofthe Treaty. This is
necessary because under the current system the date upon which an exemption can enter into
effect cannot precede the date of notification. The Commission wants to change that system
so as not to punish those companies which under the new more economic based system
working with market-share thresholds may make mistakes in the assessment of their market
position. Section IV.5 of this policy paper outlines a number of measures which are necessary
to create a reasonable level of legal certainty for economic operators. The proposed
amendment to Article 4(2) of Regulation No 17 is the most important of the measures
identified. This is because under Regulation No 17, as currently worded, the earliest date
upon which an individual exemption can have effect, subject to certain limited exceptions, is
the date of notification and not the date of the agreement. This has the effect that many
vertical agreements falling under Article 85(1), despite fulfilling the requirements for
exemption under Article 85(3), are automatically void under Article 85(2) until they have
been notified to the Commission. The fact that such agreements are automatically void
pending notification, has two negative effects. First, it results in an urmecessarily high number
of notifications and secondly, it results in the competition rules being used as a strategic tool
to avoid the enforcement of contracts, rather than as a means to address competition
problems. The objective of the draft amending text is to enable the Commission to exempt
retroactively when the notification takes place at a later date. The practical effect of such a
legislative amendment is that companies would no longer have to notify vertical agreements
which they do not believe to cause competition concerns, simply to ensure legal certainty.
Instead, companies will place greater weight on their own analysis of the economic effects of
the vertical restraints at issue, knowing that in the event of subsequent litigation it would not
be too late to apply for an exemption under Article 85(3).
OJ 36, 6.3.1965, p. 533/65.The current Commission block-exemption regulations in the field of distribution, adopted
pursuant to Regulation No 19/65, are limited to exclusive distribution , exclusive
purchasing , franchising , and motor-vehicle distribution . These regulations, with the
exception of the block-exemption on motOr-vehicle distribution which has been excluded
from the scope of the current review, cannot be satisfactorily amended to provide for the
change in policy proposed in this Communication. Therefore, subject to the adoption of the
two Council Regulations outlined above, a new Commission Regulation will be proposed.
The Regulation will extend to all vertical restraints in all sectors of distribution other than
motor vehicles, covering,  inter-alia selective distribution, services, intermediate goods and
agreements between more than two parties each operating at different levels in the
distribution chain. In the light of the new regulation the  de minimis  notice may need to
be reviewed.
Procedural steps and timing
The first procedural step will be the adoption by the Council of the two new Council
Regulations. It is only following adoption of these two Regulations that work can commence on
the procedural steps leading to the adoption by the Commission of a new group exemption
regulation and a set of guidelines in the field of vertical restraints. The Commission will submit
these two documents together for consultation with Member States, industry and other third
parties. This being the case, all the legislative changes required to implement the policy
proposals outlined in this Communication are envisaged to be in place by the year 2000.
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